This study examines whether the "soft" information present in merger and acquisition announcement press releases contains incrementally valuable news relative to traditional "hard" data and analyst generated information. We use Diction, a textual-analysis program, to construct measures of optimism and synergy expectations for more that 1,400 mergers and acquisition announcements over the period 1995 to 2007. We find that our measure of synergy expectations is inversely related to acquirer announcement period returns and continues to be negatively related to long-term performance up to two years post merger. We find that managerial optimism is not valued by the market and is especially discounted when analysts hold contrary views regarding the attractiveness of a merger. Overall, we conclude that the soft data contained in M&A announcements provides meaningful information to investors. The Contribution of Soft Data "The numbers do not inspire confidence. Over and over studies of mergers and acquisitions show that deals fail to create shareholder value. One recent survey says that more than 70 percent of acquisitions fail; another 61 percent. A third study reports that 89 percent of acquired businesses actually lose market share…" 1
Introduction
Dozens of studies have appeared in the corporate finance literature examining the performance of acquirers in the period surrounding a merger or acquisition (e.g., Asquith Bruner, and Mullins, 1983: Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Bradley, Deasi, and Kim, 1988; Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991; Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Bruner, 2002; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Bouman, Fuller, and Nain, 2009) . All of these studies, however, limit themselves to an empirical analysis of the hard or quantitative data associated with these transactions. For the most part, their focus has been on the data contained in the financial statements or the time-series of share prices of the acquirer and target.
Yet, for each of these transactions there is an abundance of non-quantitative or "soft" information. A typical press release issued by an acquirer consists of over 1,000 words and contains a significant amount of qualitative information. This soft data can convey insights and potentially valuable information that is absent from traditional quantitative data. Soft information can offer context to financial numbers and share values, provide insight into managerial expectations, and identify important qualifiers or caveats that are absent from purely numerical data. Soft information can complement or complete the quantitative analysis provided in the usual M&A press release. The extent to which this soft data provides information to investors beyond what is already provided in the quantitative information serves as the overarching research focus of this study.
We focus our analysis of soft information on the optimism and synergy expectations contained in acquirer press releases at the time of the merger announcement and continuing through merger completion. We emphasize these two attributes of soft information because of their extensive discussion in the merger literature. Beginning with the hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986) and extending to the related behavioral work on overconfidence by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) , the role of managerial optimism has been an important factor in attempting to We estimate the extent to which optimism and synergy expectations are present in our sample of M&A press releases through the use of Diction, which is a popular textual-analysis program that has been used in a number of published studies examining soft information (e.g., Li, 2006; Engelberg, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy, 2008; Demers and Vega, 2008; Brockman and Cicon, 2009) . Our use of this program allows us to estimate optimism and synergy expectations for over 1,400 M&A announcements between 1995 and 2007.
The information contained in the press release, however, must be assessed against that which already has been generated by analysts in various reports and recommendations. A number of researchers such as Dimson and Marsh (1984) , Elton, Gruber, and Grossman (1986) , Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) establish the investment value of analyst recommendations.
Therefore, to determine if there is, in fact, marginal value to the soft information contained in these press releases, we must control for the information provided by analysts. We accomplish this by including in our multivariate analysis both the number of analysts and changes in their recommendations over the merger announcement period.
We find that soft information measures of synergy are strongly associated with acquirer announcement period returns, even while controlling for the quantity and content of analyst information. Further, we observe that our measure of synergy expectations is informative regarding long-run abnormal performance for up to two years following completion of the merger. Both buy-and-hold returns and calendar-time returns suggest that high synergy expectation mergers underperform by as much as 12% over a two year horizon.
We find that our results hold even after we control for analyst activity. Specifically, we find that the number of analysts following an acquirer provides no significant explanatory power for the announcement period returns. Further, we observe that analyst downgrades, are statistically insignificant when interacted with either optimism or synergy expectations. We conclude that the information contained in the synergy expectations matters even after controlling for analyst information.
We further establish that managerial optimism is unrelated to either short or long term performance by the acquirer. We find that managerial optimism is not valued by the market and is especially discounted when analysts hold contrary views regarding merger attractiveness.
These results are consistent with the popular belief that merger announcements are excessively optimistic and provide little value to investors. This study contributes to the literature by answering two important research questions.
First, we inquire whether the soft information released at the time of a merger announcement and continuing through the merger completion date possesses economic content for investors. Our findings from this analysis will allow us to better understand the market reaction to merger announcements as well as add to the limited, but expanding literature, on the importance of soft information. Second, we test whether soft information can explain differences in the long-term performance of mergers. By focusing on the soft information that is available to investors, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of the long-term value creation potential of M&A activity and allow for a more thorough understanding of the performance behavior of these business combinations. By exploring these two questions, we are able to answer this study's fundamental research question concerning the information content of this soft information. We find that it does contain investor useful data even after we control for the information generated by analysts concerning the merger.
The remainder of our study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our process for sample construction and describes our data. In section 3 we describe both our textual and performance methodologies. Our empirical results for both the announcement period and long term are presented in section 4. We conclude in section 5 with a brief summary and a discussion of our findings.
Sample Construction and Data
In this section, we discuss the data from which we draw our initial sample, the specific selection criteria we use to construct our final sample, our procedures for estimating managerial optimism and synergy expectations, and a description of how we estimate both short-run and longer-term abnormal performance. We also provide an initial discussion of the key characteristics of our final sample of acquiring firms.
Sample Selection and Description
We construct our sample of acquiring firms using criteria comparable to those applied by Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009) , hereafter referred to as BFN. We obtain an initial sample of completed tender offers and mergers from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. This preliminary sample includes all deals announced between January 1995 and December 2007. We then impose a number of additional criteria that a firm must satisfy for inclusion in the final sample. These are:
1. The acquirer is a US firm listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX 2. Daily acquirer return data is available from the CRSP database surrounding the announcement date and the book-to-market ratio is available from COMPUSTAT.
3. The transaction is valued in excess of $50 million.
4. Financial firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 are excluded.
5. The method of payment is cash, stock, or a mixture of the two.
6. The initial press release is at least 500 words in length.
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Our application of these criteria produces a final sample of 1,421 acquiring firms.
We present our sample descriptive statistics in Table 1 Panel B contains the distribution of our sample by industry. We assign each firm to one of ten broad industries based on a firm's four digit SIC code. These industries are initially defined by Fama and French (1997) . We observe that the highest concentration of deals occurs in the high-tech industry (30.5%), followed by other (24.2%) and then healthcare/medical (10.7%). The least represented industry groupings are consumer durables (1.3%) and utilities (3.3%).
In Panel C we present a set of descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of our sample of mergers. Generally, the values for our sample are consistent with those reported by BFN. The relative size of these deals is large, representing, on average, 60% of the market value of the acquirer's equity. The mean (median) acquirer market capitalization is approximately $10 billion ($1.6 billion) while the mean (median) transaction size is $238 million ($155.08 million).
Approximately 43% of our sample deals are cash financed, while 19% are finance solely with stock. Cross-border deals, in which the target is based outside of the U.S., account for 15% of our sample. Pooling of interests accounting is infrequently used by our sample of merger, representing only 11% of the sample acquirers. Finally, we find that only 6% of the deals in our sample are tender offers.
Collection of M&A Announcements and Analyst Recommendations
To obtain the press releases, which are the focus of our textual analysis, we create a database containing the date, time, and ticker symbols of the merging firms over our sample period. This data is obtained from the Thomson Financial M&A database. We use this identifying information to search LexisNexis for firm-issued press releases concerning M&A activity. We restrict our search by filtering on the subject line for " 'mergers & acquisitions' OR merger OR acquisition" 3 . In addition, we exclude any press release which does not contain at least one of the following keywords in its headline: "purchase OR acquire OR merge OR merger". Where a company issues the same press release to multiple news providers on the same day we use the earliest press release. We do not use information from the smaller news providers on LexusNexus because this information tends to be abbreviated and often is simply a link to the provider's website. Therefore, we limit our selection of press releases to those provided by PR Newswire (US), Business Wire, and Canada Newswire.
We obtain our data regarding the number of analysts and their recommendations from the I/B/E/S recommendation file. The I/B/E/S data allows us to track recommendations issued by individual analysts and to follow analysts as they migrate from one firm to another.
Textual and Performance Methodologies

1 Textual Analysis Methodology
The textual analysis of our sample of M&A press releases focuses on the presence of two Fan and Goyal (2002) report positive combined announcement period returns to the acquirer and target in a merger, leading them to conclude that synergy is an important explanatory factor for merger activity.
The literature also notes the importance that optimism exerts in the merger process. Roll (1986) , for instance, contends that merger bidding is based on managerial hubris. In his model, the manager who has the most optimistic forecast about the target ends up overbidding for the firm and suffers the negative consequences of a winner's curse. Roll's argument seems to suggest that mergers predicated on optimism are likely to result in value losses to the acquirer at the time of the announcement.
A survey of managers directly involved in mergers also provides confirmation for overoptimism as an explanation for M&A activity. Bruner (2007) reports findings from polling 50 business executives and finds that , on average, respondents claim that only 37% of all deals create value for acquirers. Interestingly, when the survey focused on executives who were actually involved in a M&A transaction, 58% of these "informed" respondents believed that their own M&A deal created value. Bruner's findings are consistent with the premise that executives are overoptimistic about the value they create in their own deals.
The literature examining the failure of mergers and acquisitions to meet expectations also provides insight into the role of optimism in M&A activity. Included among the top three reasons found for merger failure is the overestimations of synergy potential and consequent overpayment for the target (Agrawal and Jaffe, 1999; DePamphillis, 2008) . As the literature notes, this excess payment for the target is often due to the acquirer's over-optimism with regard to the operating efficiencies and increased revenues that the new business combination is projected to generate.
More recently, Rosen (2006) examines momentum in the market reaction to mergers and concludes that investor sentiment is an important factor in explaining the market's response. He finds that when investor expectations are based more on optimism than fundamentals, the shortrun share price increase attributable to the announcement is reversed as performance fails to meet optimistic expectations.
Thus, the literature regarding the nature and causes of merger activity establishes an important role for managerial optimism and synergy expectations. Consequently our examination of the soft information contained in a merger announcement will focus on these two attributes.
We use Diction, a language processing software package, to generate our estimates of managerial optimism and synergy expectations. Diction is used by other researchers such as Ober et al. (1999) 
Estimation of Managerial Optimism and Synergy Expectations
Diction defines optimism as "language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive accomplishments" (Carroll, 2000) . The program generates an aggregate standardized score for optimism by counting words in defined categories and combining the standardized scores for each category according to the formula below:
The definitions of these six components are provided in the appendix to this manuscript and reflect their use by Diction.
We also examine the influence that synergy expectations have upon performance.
Diction, however, does not explicitly contain a synergy term for use in textual analysis.
Consequently, we synthesize a synergy term by combining two related terms which Diction does define. These terms are cooperation and rapport. Thus, our synergy score is estimated as the sum of the Diction scores for cooperation and rapport as below and elaborated upon in the appendix:
Carroll (2000) defines cooperation as a semantic feature capturing "behavioral interactions among people that often result in a group product. Included in these terms are neutral interactions (consolidate, mediate, alignment), job-related tasks (network, detente, exchange) and personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, contribute), which can relate to the generation of synergy between two merged entities".
Diction defines rapport as a semantic feature which captures "attitudinal similarities among groups of people. Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus)".
Descriptive statistics for our estimates of the soft information scores are reported in Tables 1 and 2 . Panel B of Table 1 provides an industry distribution of soft scores for both optimism and synergy. We find that the highest optimism scores occur in consumer durables and manufacturing. Managers appear least optimistic about mergers occurring in healthcare, medical equipment & drugs and the energy sector. Synergy expectations are the highest in high tech and healthcare. Synergy is least anticipated in consumer durables and non-durables.
In panel A of Table 2 we report that the mean (median) word count for our sample of merger announcements and find it is 1,018 (824) words. This confirms that Diction has sufficient text to analyze. By construction, the synergy expectations, optimism, rapport, and cooperation scores have mean (median) values close to 0. This occurs because these measures are normalized for each document using the mean and standard deviation of the occurrences of these measures throughout our entire data set.
Panel B presents the correlations among the scores for our soft information. We find that optimism is positively correlated with both components of our synergy measure, but the magnitude is very low, ranging from 0.03 to 0.06. The correlation between the two components of synergy, rapport and cooperation is only 0.16. This further confirms that these two attributes capture different dimensions of any possible synergy within a merger.
In Panels C and D we present data concerning the flow of corporate press releases from the announcement to the completion date of the merger. Panel C illustrates the dramatic decline in the number of press releases after the merger. Indeed, only 29.8% of our sample firms issue a press release at any time after the merger and only 13.7% provide any on the completion date.
The mean number of press releases per firm following the merger announcement is only 0.59.
As shown in panel D, the mean (median) number of days between merger announcement and completion is short and is 71.6 (55).
Panel D also contains some other interesting analysis of this post-announcement information. We notice that the word count of these subsequent releases is smaller than that calculated for the announcement releases. Thus, less total information appears to be provided in these follow-on releases. Also, we find that the optimism in these post-announcement scores significantly declines relative to that estimated at the announcement. Thus, it seems that managers recalibrate their confidence regarding the merger in the days following the announcement. Nevertheless, we fail to detect any change in their expectations regarding synergy during the post-announcement period.
Performance Measurement
To assess the information value attributable to our measures of synergy expectations and optimism, we estimate both short and long term measures of firm performance. We estimate the immediate impact of these scores by estimating the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARS) relative to the CRSP value-weighted index. We calculate returns for each day in a three day window surrounding the announcement date -from one day prior to one day after the announcement of the merger. The CARs are estimated by summing the daily abnormal returns over the three-day window.
We measure the long-run abnormal performance of the acquirer by using two distinct approaches. The first approach relies on computing buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), while the second relies on calendar-time returns. Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) show that both approaches yield well-specified test statistics in random samples.
To compute long-run BHAR, we follow the approach of BFN and form 50 reference portfolios each month on the basis of market capitalization and book-to-market ratio. Following
Loughran and Ritter (2000), we do not include firms in our reference portfolios that completed an acquisition in the three years prior to the acquisition. Inclusion of such firms could bias the results towards finding no abnormal performance.
For each security in the reference portfolio, we first find the compounded return over the period of interest. Next, we sum across all securities in the reference portfolio. In other words, we perform the following calculation:
Where R pT is the reference portfolio return, R jt is the return in month t on firm j, n s is the number of securities in the reference portfolio, and T is the investment horizon in months. It's important to note that there is no investment in firms following date s and no rebalancing. We assume that the proceeds of delisted firms are invested in the CRSP value-weighted index. This approach is free of the new-listing and rebalancing bias documented by Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999).
For each sample, firm we then calculate the long-run BHAR as the return on the sample firm minus the return on the appropriate reference portfolio. That is, the BHAR is defined as:
Where R it is the month t return for sample firm i, R pT is the reference portfolio return as calculated above, and T is the horizon in months over which returns are calculated.
Our second approach for measuring abnormal performance relies on the calendar time approach used by Mitchell and Stafford (2000) . The advantage of this approach is that any cross-sectional correlations of the individual event firms will be accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar time.
Since we are interested in the difference in long-run returns between high and low synergy expectation firms, we estimate regressions of the following form:
Here, R p,t is the event portfolio return, R m,t -R f,t is the excess return on the market, SMB is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small and big stocks, HML is the difference in returns between a portfolio of high and low book-to-market stocks, PR1YR is Carhart's (1997) momentum factor, and D equals one if the event portfolio return is a High Synergy return and zero otherwise. The primary variable of interest is D, which captures the return difference between and high and low synergy event portfolios. This approach is identical to that used by BFN to examine acquirer performance in high and low valuation periods.
Empirical Results
Announcement period returns
Our initial analysis of the market reaction to a M&A announcement is presented in panel A of Table 3 . We find that in the aggregate, the market reacts positively to M&A activity, with a statistically significant mean CAR of 0.74% for the three-day announcement period return from day-1 through day +1. For longer event windows, we observe correspondingly larger CARs which are also statistically significant. The five day CAR for day -2 through day +2 is 1.19% while the twenty-one day CAR (days -10 through +10) is 1.59%.
In Panel B, we examine the behavior of CARs based on the nature of the soft information provided in the press release. To examine the effect of soft scores on the sample CARs, we construct separate high and low subsamples for the synergy expectations and optimism measures. Mergers falling in the top 25 th percentile of the synergy score are classified as having high synergy expectations, while all others are classified as having low synergy expectations.
Similarly, mergers in the top quarter based on their optimism score are classified as high optimism transactions.
Our findings show significant differences in the announcement period returns based on the level of synergy expectations. The average 3-day CAR for high synergy expectations firms is -0.60% versus 1.19% for low synergy expectations firms, with the difference being statistically significant. Comparable results obtain for the other two event windows. These results suggest that the market generally takes a pessimistic view that synergy expectations will be met in most mergers. The market appears to discount the high synergy expectations of managers and might believe that the acquirer has overpaid for the target due to an unrealistic assessment of merger synergies.
There is no significant difference in the announcement period returns across levels of optimism. This might be due to the perception that M&A announcements are generally associated with excessive optimism and that differences in already inflated levels of optimism are not meaningful to the market.
In the third section of Panel B, we compare CARs resulting from announcements that are classified as having both high synergy and high optimism to those that have low synergy expectations and low optimism. To construct these cells, we independently sort firms into quintiles on the basis of both optimism and synergy. High Optimism firms are defined as those with optimism scores in the highest quartile. Similarly, high synergy expectation firms are defined as those with synergy expectation scores in the highest quartile. The intersection of these subsamples allows us to construct other sub-samples that are based on both optimism and synergy.
Interestingly, we find that the market reacts positively to the low synergy expectation-low optimism announcements, but negatively to the high synergy-high optimism announcements.
The difference in these CARs is statistically significant across all three event windows. We interpret these findings as consistent with the market viewing low synergy expectation-low optimism announcements as more credible and containing, on balance, positive information about the merger.
Analyst Activity
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stickel (1995) , Womack (1996) , among others, have noted the investment value contained in the information generated by security analysts. If the soft information contained in press releases is to be meaningful to investors, then it must contain information that is different relative to that provided in analyst reports and recommendations. We consider two dimensions of analyst activity and how they might influence the ability of soft information to explain merger performance. The first is the number of analysts which captures the volume of information generated by the analyst community regarding a merger. The second focuses on the information content of data produced by analysts and is captured by changes in analyst recommendations.
In Table 4 we provide an initial description of the analyst data available for our sample of mergers across various expected synergy and optimism subsamples. In panel A we examine analyst activity based on the level of synergy expectations. We find that firms with both high and low synergy expectations are well-covered by analysts, with an average of 11.14 analysts across the two sub-samples. There is, however, a suggestion that acquirers having high expectations fo Panel B explores these attributes of analyst activity across the optimism levels of the acquiring firms. The results are comparable to those we observe for synergy expectations. We again note that the acquirers assigned to these sub-samples are widely followed, with mean analyst coverage of 10.94. There is no significant difference in the number of analysts covering the acquirer based on the level of optimism. We also find no difference in the nature of the recommendation changes across subsamples. Approximately equal percentages of upgrades, downgrades, and reiterations are contained in each of the two optimism-based subsamples. We conclude that neither the quantity nor the nature of the analyst recommendations varies significantly across acquirers based on their optimism. Together, the findings in these two tables imply that analyst information does not vary much across acquirers even when we control for the soft information contained in our measures of synergy expectations and optimism. We examine the impact of this analyst activity and its relation to announcement synergy expectations and optimism more fully in the following multivariate analysis.
Regression Analysis of Performance
In this section we undertake a multivariate analysis of the announcement period returns.
This approach allows us to control for a number of factors suggested in the literature that have explanatory power with respect to merger performance. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) show that the method of payment has an effect on the returns to bidder firms, with cash deals being associated with higher returns than stock-based transactions. Cash Deal assumes the value of one if the acquisitions method of payment is cash and zero otherwise. Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find larger returns to acquiring firms for tender offers as compared to negotiated transactions. The Financial Accounting Standards Board eliminated the pooling-of-interests method of accounting in 2002. Despite a preference by many CEOs for the use of the pooling method prior to its elimination, Walter (1999) shows that the share price of acquiring firms is not penalized when the pooling method is not used to account for a merger. where AR is either the three day announcement period return, longer-term BHAR, or the accounting abnormal return. Table 5 examines the determinants of announcement period returns using the regression specification given in (6), which controls for other determinants of announcement period returns established in the literature. In the first specification presented in Table 5 , we present a baseline model that does not include our measures of soft information. We find that the pooling of interests approach for merger accounting is significant and inversely related to announcement period returns. The high valuation indicator variable is also statistically significant and is positively related to the CARs. This evidence is consistent with Abboody, Kasznik, and Williams (2000) and Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2002) who provide evidence that managers appear to pay higher premium in order to obtain pooling of interest.
Pooling of Interests
In the second model specification, we find that the coefficient on High Synergy Deal is -1.31 and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.03. This implies that those acquisitions motivated by synergistic gains generate a 1.31% lower announcement period return all else equal. The coefficients on all other variables are similar to those presented in specification 1.
In the third specification, we examine the interaction of High Synergy with both Relative Size and Optimism. Consistent with our belief that synergy gains will be more difficult to achieve in complex deals, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction of High Synergy and Relative Size. We find no significant relation between announcement period returns and our measure of optimism, nor do we find any interaction effect between High Optimism and High Synergy.
The last model specification introduces the number of analysts and an indicator variable for recommendation downgrade. In spite of controlling for these measures of analyst activity, we find that synergy expectations continues to be significantly and inversely related to announcement period returns. The level of optimism, even when interacted with a recommendation change, remains statistically insignificant.
The analysis presented in this section suggests that soft information measures of synergy are strongly associated with acquirer announcement period returns. The higher the expectations of synergy, the lower the announcement period returns. This relation holds even after we introduce two measures of analyst activity. We conclude that soft information possesses new information that investors find value relevant as they assess the likely success of an announced merger.
BHAR Long-run returns
The findings reported so far suggest that mergers with high expectations of synergy tend to experience lower announcement period returns. This is consistent with the market discounting the likelihood that synergy gains will be recognized. In this section, we examine whether our measure of synergy expectations is associated with long-run abnormal performance. We examine long-run returns at the one, two, and three-year horizons.
For our analysis of long-term performance, we re-estimate the soft measures of optimism and synergy expectations. For our analysis of the immediate market reaction to the news of a merger, we constructed our soft measures solely from the press releases issued at the time of the merger announcement. But for this long-term analysis, we construct the soft information measures using all press releases issued from the date of the announcement to the completion date. This increases the total number of press releases analyzed from 1,421 to 2.804
We present our initial results in Table 6 . In panel A we provide estimates of one, two and three-year BHAR returns for the aggregate sample. We find that the mean one-year abnormal return is -4.02% and further declines to -8.61% after three years. These results are consistent Rau and Vermaelen (1997) and the general conclusion that mergers underperform in the long run.
In panel B, we explicitly introduce our soft information measures into the long-run analysis. We find that mergers associated with high expectations of synergy generate significantly more negative long-run returns than those with low synergy expectations. This result holds across the one, two and three-year long-run measures. Thus, mergers viewed by the acquirer as being exceptionally capable of generating synergies, underperform in the post-merger period relative to those mergers not so identified. An examination of high versus low optimism transactions reveals no significant differences in BHAR returns at either the one, two or threeyear horizon. This result is consistent with the announcement period results earlier documented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Table 7 contains examines whether analyst coverage subsumes the relation between soft scores and long-run performance. In panel A, we compare long-run BHARs across high and low analyst following subsamples, while controlling for various levels of synergy, optimism and combinations of the two. We find that across all three BHAR time horizons and for all soft information constructed subsamples, that the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results suggest that controlling for the amount of analyst-generated information available to investors does not change the effect of synergy expectations or optimism on long-run performance.
Panel B presents similar findings for changes in recommendations. Specifically, we compare the various BHARs between upgraded and downgraded recommendations while controlling for various levels of synergy expectations and optimism. Comparable to our results for analyst following, we fail to find any significant differences, suggesting that recommendation changes add no new information about long-run performance after controlling for the synergy expectations or optimism levels. We conclude from the univariate results presented in panels A and B that analyst activity does not add new information about long-term performance after we control for the soft data effects of synergy expectations and optimism. Tables 6 and 7 and presents a series of multivariate regressions of the effect of soft information on one, two and three year buy and hold returns. In addition to controlling for a number of variables identified in the literature as influencing mergers, we also control for the number of analysts and analyst recommendation downgrade. Because optimism by analysts and managers is expected by investors and shown to have little market impact, we limit our analysis of recommendation changes to downgrades. Downgrades indicate a divergence of belief about the profitability of the merger between the acquiring managers and the investment community. Hence, such recommendations are more likely to contain new information than upgrades which can be viewed as confirmatory of the acquirer's initial optimism. This approach allows us to examine the effect of synergy expectations and optimism while controlling for the information generated by analysts.
The variable of most interest in these regression is High Synergy Deal since it refers to those mergers with high expectations regarding future synergies. We find that High Synergy Deal is negatively related to the BHAR for all three years, but is statistically significant only for years one and two. At year three, the soft information effect attributable to synergy expectations appears to vanish. This result shows that high synergy firms continue to under-perform up to two years following the acquisition completion date. This result appears to intensify with larger deals, but the coefficient of the interactive term with Relative Size is statistically significant for only one of the three years examined. We find that the number of analysts negatively influences the long-run returns over the entire three years of our examination period, but that analyst recommendation downgrades are significant for only year one and interactive with high optimism. The other independent variables are statistically insignificant. Fama (1998) notes a number of problems with long-run abnormal returns and advocates a calendar time approach. An analysis of calendar time returns using the Fama-French three factors augmented with a momentum factor is presented in Panel A of Table 9 . We estimate the relation between long-term performance and High Synergy in the context of the Fama-French model for a one, two and three-year time horizon. The results presented in the first column, suggest that acquirers with high synergy expectations for their mergers underperform by -0.96 percent per month in the first year after the merger completion date. Compounded over one year, this amounts to approximately a -12% abnormal return. Table 9 shows that high synergy expectations continue to be negatively associated with long-term performance for multiple years following the merger.
Recently, Chen and Zhang (2009) offer an alternative three-factor model which claims to better explain many patterns in cross-sectional returns compared to the Fama-French model (1993). Chen and Zhang construct their model from the q-theory of Tobin (1969) and Cochrane (1991) . They identify their three factors as the market excess return, the difference between the return on a portfolio of low investment and high investment stocks, and the difference in returns between a high returns on assets stock portfolio and a low returns on assets stock portfolio. We estimate an equation similar to (3) using these three Chen and Zhang factors. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 9 and are similar to those obtained for the Fama-French factors.
Specifically, the coefficient on D is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, for both years one and two. This suggests that high synergy mergers underperform fro up to two years following merger completion.
In sum, the results in this section suggest that our soft score synergy measure tends to be informative for long-run abnormal performance. We find evidence that synergy is most informative at horizons of one and two years. Both buy-and-hold returns and calendar-time returns suggest that mergers characterized as high synergy combinations ultimately underperform by nearly 12% in the first year and over 7% in the second year.
Conclusion
In this study we examine whether the "soft" information contained in the text of merger and acquisition announcement press releases contains incrementally valuable data for investors. We use Diction, a textual-analysis program, to construct measures of managerial optimism and synergy expectations for more that 1,400 mergers and acquisition announcements over the period 1995 to 2007 which serve as our measures of soft information. Our analysis leads to several important and interesting findings.
We find that our soft measure of synergy expectations is significantly and inversely related to acquirer announcement period returns. This information appears to have value even when we control for the quantity and content of information provided by analysts. Synergy expectations are also negatively related to the long-run abnormal performance of the acquiring firm. We find, however, that the value of soft information is perishable and most consistently has explanatory power for performance only up to two years following merger completion. In aggregate, these results suggest that M&As which are driven by expectations of high synergy are discounted by market investors. This likely reflects the numerous difficulties associated with achieving a merger's projected synergies or a belief by the market that the acquiring firm has overpaid for its target.
We also find that optimism fails to provide an explanation of either announcement period or long-term returns. We see this as consistent with arguments that merger announcements are highly optimistic, perhaps reflecting managerial overconfidence or hubris. Given this tendency towards excessive optimism, it is not surprising that the market fails to attribute any value to highly favorable merger announcements.
We conclude that soft information can provide an important complement to the hard information contained in M&A announcements. Soft information helps to explain important aspects of the merger or the target's valuation that can not be captured in hard data or provided in analyst reports and recommendations. But the importance of this study extends beyond that of an analysis of the information content of press releases that accompany M&A announcements.
Soft information accompanies virtually all corporate activities and transactions. This suggests that a deeper understanding of these activities can be gained by a careful analysis of the soft information contained in the various documents that accompany these corporate events.
APPENDIX: Construction of Optimism and Synergy Measures
Our measures of optimism and synergy to classify the press releases are based on the following terms as described in the Diction 5.0 User Manual. As noted in equation (1) BLAME: Terms designating social inappropriateness as well as downright evil compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances or unplanned vicissitudes are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations.
HARDSHIP: This dictionary contains natural disasters, hostile actions (killers, and censurable human behavior). It also includes unsavory political outcomes as well as normal human fears and incapacities. DENIAL: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions, negative functions words, and terms designating null sets.
Using equation (2) , we construct our measure of synergy using an arithmetic combination of the following two terms that are defined as below by Diction:
Cooperation: This term describes attitudinal similarities among groups of people.
Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), assent (approve, vouched, warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and id entity (equivalent, resemble, consensus)."
Rapport: This term designates behavioral interactions among people that often result in a group product. Included are designations of formal work relations (unions, schoolmates, caucus) and informal association s (chum, partner, cronies) to more intimate interactions (sisterhood, friendship, comrade). Also included are neutral interactions (consolidate, mediate, alignment), job-related tasks (network, detente, exchange), personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, contribute), and self-denial (public-spirited, care-taking, self-sacrifice)".
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for our sample of completed acquisitions between 1995 and 2007. Financial firms and acquisitions where the deal value is less than $50 million are excluded. Industry classifications are based on the Fama-French ten industry groupings. Acquiror Market Cap. is the market capitalization of the acquiring firm four weeks prior to the announcement of the deal. Transaction Value is the value of the acquisition in millions of dollars. Relative Size is the transaction value divided by Acquiror Market Cap. Cash Deal takes the value of one if the acquisitions method of payment was cash and zero otherwise. Stock Deal takes the value of one if the method of payment was stock and zero otherwise. Cross Border Deal is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the target was based outside of the U.S. Pooling of Interests takes the value of one if the accounting method was pooling of interests and zero otherwise. Tender Offer assumes the value of one if the deal was a tender offer and zero otherwise. The construction of optimism and synergy expectations are described in the Appendix and rely upon the dictionaries contained in Diction. +1 ) is the acquiror's market adjusted return from one day before the announcement of the acquisition to one day after the acquisition. CAR(-2,+2) and CAR(-10,+10) are similarly defined. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Table 9 . Fama-French Regressions for Acquirers with High Synergy Expectations Mkt-R f is the return on a portfolio formed by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill rate from the valueweighted market return. SMB is the difference each month between the return on small firms and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. PR1YR is the difference each month between returns on firms with high and low prior year returns. INV is the difference between the return on a portfolio of low investment-to-assets stocks and the return on a portfolio of high investment-to-assets stocks. ROA is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high earnings-to-assets stocks and the return on a portfolio of low earnings-to-assets stocks. D equals one if the event portfolio return is a High Synergy return and zero otherwise. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
